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An Evaluation of the Redistributive Effects of a Tax Reform in




This paper employs microsimulation methods to assess redistributive effects of the implemen-
tation of two separate fiscal reforms in the Dominican Republic, one altering the personal
income tax and another altering value added taxes. For the former, behavioral responses
are estimated through a discrete choice labor supply model with formal and informal hour
points in the choice set and through the calibration of elasticities of hours with respect
to remuneration and with respect to non-labor income. For the latter, the AIDS model is
employed to estimate price elasticities of 12 consumption groups. In both reform scenarios,
results highlight the role of informal markets as a progressivity driver, as it serves as a tax
burden mitigation mechanism for households in the poorest quintiles, allowing that, when all
households are made worse-off after a tax reform, relative tax burdens remain progressive.
JEL: H22, H24, J22
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1 Introduction
In 2012, the Dominican Government approved the National Development Strategy (END in
Spanish) in which it stated its goal of increasing the country’s tax revenue as a percentage of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 13.1% in 2012 to 19.0% in 2020. However, the only
significant tax hike implemented during this period was an increase from 16% to 18% of the
standard value-added tax (VAT) rate. As a result, in 2019 the ratio of tax revenue to GDP
stood at only 13.4%. There is currently a widespread public perception that a long-overdue
fiscal reform is coming in the near future. This has been confirmed by current administration
officials, who have only disclosed the guiding principles of the upcoming reform, which
include an increase in government revenue and a focus on distributive equity. The increase
in revenue is expected to be generated through an increase in taxes.
Before a reform of this kind is implemented, policymakers must be aware of its efficiency
and redistributive implications. The presence of highly informal labor markets and of
informal markets of goods and services as well as other sources of heterogeneity in the tax
system adds a series of complications to this analysis. A set of tools that are specifically
designed to address this heterogeneity are microsimulation models (MSMs). MSMs allow
the simulation of the effects of a policy on a sample of economic agents (individuals
or households) at the individual level. This policy simulation consists of evaluating the
economic consequences brought by new policy measures on a vector of indicators of
the activity or welfare for each individual agent in a sample and possibly their behavior
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006, p. 2). To my knowledge, these types of models have
not been applied in the context of tax reforms in the Dominican Republic.
In this paper, I explore the redistributive implications with behavioral responses of
two different tax policy measures that are not assumed to occur simultaneously: first, an
increase in the personal income tax rate of 5 percentage points for each personal income
tax bracket, including the exempted bracket in the baseline, and second, an elimination of
all tax exemptions on goods and services in the VAT, except for the health and education
consumption categories. For the personal income tax section, I first develop a discrete choice
labor supply model like the one developed by Van Soest (1995) based on the assumption
that utility maximizing agents choose from a set of formal and informal working hour points,
where the utility is defined over net income and leisure time. Once I simulate the tax policy
change, the individual faces a new net income level in their utility function, from which
behavioral responses within the formal and informal hours set and welfare changes can be
derived. Second, I adopt the calibration approach in Spadaro (2005) by using calibrated
values for the elasticity of a proxy of hours with respect to remuneration and with respect to
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non-labor income in order to obtain post-reform income measure changes.
For the VAT reform simulation, I first take into account informality in goods and services
markets by employing the methodology in Bachas et al. (2020). I then develop an Almost
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for the households in the sample from which I gather the price
elasticities of 12 consumption groups and proceed to the simulation exercise.
I find that, as expected, all household quintiles will be negatively impacted by the
simulated reforms, although in varying degrees. I find that the model specified by Van Soest
(1995), which is commonly used in the European microsimulation literature, fails to fit
the Dominican survey data. I suggest that in developing countries labor supply choices
might not be based on leisure preferences but rather imposed based on market structure and
deficiencies, which trivializes the discrete labor supply model. In the calibration approach, I
find that the predominance of informal employment in the poorest quintiles mitigates the
impact of a personal income tax reform. I also find that when elasticities are high, inequality
is worsened. Finally, I find that informality, and not existing exemptions, in the markets of
goods and services is the main driver of progressivity in the Dominican VAT system.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review of utilized
microsimulation models. Section 3 introduces the Dominican tax system. Section 4 shows
the specification, estimation and microsimulation results from the discrete choice model
and the calibration approach. Section 5 shows the specification, microsimulation estimation
and results of the AIDS model and the simulation of the VAT tax reform. Lastly, Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Review
Microsimulation models (MSMs) are widely used in the evaluation of policy changes in
tax-benefit systems. These models allow simulating the effects of said policies at the level of
the samples’ observational units or in relevant aggregations, thereby taking into account
the heterogeneity of the economic agents. MSMs have been in use since the early 1980s
following the rise of large and detailed datasets on individual agents and the increases
in computing power (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). Depending on the inclusion of
behavioral responses to the simulated policy changes, Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)
classify these models into arithmetical MSMs, when behavioral responses are ignored, and
behavioral MSMs, when some form of agent responses are included. Typically, behavioral
responses take the form of changes in agents’ labor market supply when the reform introduces
changes in the personal income tax-benefit system or changes in agents’ demand of goods
and services, when the reform is implemented through the indirect tax system.
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MSMs, and particularly those that center around personal income, are predominant in
developed countries, with examples such as the FASIT for Sweden, Espasim for Spain,
CBOLT and TAXSIM for the United States and EUROMOD for the European Union and
the United Kingdom, among others. In Latin America, as in developing countries in general,
these models are less common. Absalon and Urzua (2011) point to the fact that fiscal and
social reforms in Latin America are subject to pronounced political swings, which generates
constant variation to an already non-generous tax-benefit system. Urzúa (2012) surveys
Latin American research on microsimulation models and points to five leading studies
that embody full-size microsimulation models for five countries: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala,
Mexico and Uruguay1. The models developed for these countries range from simulating
reforms in personal income tax rates and social security contributions to consumption tax
rates by incorporating labor supply and demand of goods and services responses. More recent
regional efforts include the development of LATINMOD, an integrated microsimulation
model for six Latin American countries2.
One crucial aspect of microsimulation models in the context of tax reforms is the
modelling strategy of the behavioral response. This may be done through the estimation of a
structural econometric model for the households in the sample or though the calibration of a
behavioral model with some predetermined structure Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006, p.
13). An application of the latter approach can be found in Spadaro (2005).
One estimation method commonly employed in the personal income tax microsimulation
literature is to incorporate behavioral responses through discrete choice models of labor
supply. These models treat labor supply as a discrete variable consisting of only a few
alternative values, as opposed to the continuous modelling of labor supply. This model
was first developed by Van Soest (1995). Important illustrations were provided by Hoynes
(1996) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) in the context of labor supply and welfare program
participation. Other contributions include the examination of the labor market behavior of
married women in the UK (Duncan and Weeks, 1997) and the evaluation of the effect of
tax credits on hours worked by Blundell et al. (2000). More recent papers utilizing discrete
choice models are Pacifico (2009) applied for Italy and Labeaga et al. (2005) and Oliver
and Spadaro (2017) for Spain.
Van Soest (1995) notes that the main advantage of these models is that they allow for all
kinds of nonlinearities and non-convexities in the budget set while also being computationally
tractable, which makes them desirable in the analysis of tax and benefit policies. However,
1Nogueira et al. (2011), Larrañaga et al. (2011), Castanon-Herrera and Urzua (2011), Absalon and
Urzua (2011), Amarante et al. (2007) and Amarante et al. (2011).
2Centro Estrategico Latinoamericano de Geopolitica (2018).
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Creedy and Kalb (2005) point to the fact that one disadvantage of the model is that the
usual formulae for poverty and inequality measures cannot be applied directly because these
models do not identify a particular level of hours worked for each observational unit after a
policy change but rather results in a probability distribution over the discrete values (or more
specifically hours, if these constitute the choice set) used. Nonetheless, this disadvantage can
be circumvented by utilizing the product of the relevant probabilities, by using the approach
of expected income sampling approach (Gerfin and Leu, 2003) or by treating all possible
outcomes of each observational unit as different observations (Creedy and Scutella, 2004).
Studies incorporating behavioral responses in an indirect rather than direct tax reform
are less common in developed countries. (Decoster and Verwerft, 2011). For consumption
taxes, and particularly VAT microsimulation, the existence of MSMs is rare, and more so
when accounting for behavioral responses. In order to address this gap in the literature,
Siemers (2014) develops a basic general VAT-MSM, applicable to the European Union
member states, or countries with similar consumption tax systems and applies it to the
case of Germany. However, since developing countries, and particularly Latin American
countries, rely heavily on indirect taxation for government revenue collection, the ex-ante
analysis of indirect taxation reforms is more common.
A method for incorporating behavioral responses in indirect tax reforms consists of
obtaining elasticities for consumption goods and services and taking them into consideration
when altering relative prices in the economy through a tax reform. A method commonly
used for obtaining said elasticities is to estimate a system of demand equations. The first
estimation of a system of demand equations stemming from consumer preferences theory
was developed by Stone (1954). Further contributions were introduced by Theil (1965)
and Barten (1969), who proposed the Rotterdam system, and by proposals such as the
indirect Translog model by Christensen et al. (1975), who introduced further flexibility
to the functional forms. Currently, the demand system more widely used in empirical
work is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), developed by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980), which satisfies a set of desirable characteristics. Particularity, the AIDS provides
an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system, offers an exact aggregation
over consumers without depending on parallel linear Engel curves, satisfies the axioms of
choice and, lastly, allows for the homogeneity and symmetry properties to be tested by linear
parameter restrictions (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
Notable early applications of the AIDS to the tax reform literature find their roots
in authors such as Decoster and Schokkaert (1990) for the Belgian indirect tax system,
Nichèle and Robin (1995) for indirect tax reform alternatives for France. Since developing
countries, and particularly Latin American countries, rely heavily on indirect taxation
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for Government revenue collection, the ex-ante analysis of indirect taxation reforms and,
therefore, the application of demand systems in said empirical analysis are to be expected.
Recent works that utilize AIDS preferences for Latin America have been authored by
Asano et al. (2004), who analyze the optimal commodity taxes for Brazil, and by Figueroa
and Peña (2017), who examine the implications of an increase of VAT on poverty, inequality
and welfare for Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Further empirical applications for
Latin America, such the work of Oliva (2008) for Ecuador and Abramovsky et al. (2015)
for Mexico, utilize the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS), developed by
Blundell et al. (1997). QUAIDS differ from AIDS in that the former allows Engel curves to
be quadratic, therefore allowing goods to be necessities at one level of income and luxuries
at another level.
3 Tax Incidence in the Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic’s tax system depends considerably on taxes on goods and services,
which comprise 56.7% of the total tax revenue (Table 1). In particular, internal and external
Value Added Taxes (VAT) represent 35.0%. One-third of the tax revenue corresponds to
taxes on income, profits and capital gains, where Business Income Tax (BIT) and Personal
Income Tax (PIT), generate 15.7% and 9.7%, respectively.
Table 1: Tax Revenue in the Dominican Republic
2019 (Millions of DOP) % of Total
Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains 194,280.7 31.8
Corporate Income Tax 96,181.4 15.7
Personal Income Tax 59,447.7 9.7
Other Taxes 38,651.6 6.3
Property tax 29,564.5 4.8
Taxes on Goods and Services 346,896.6 56.7
General Taxes on Goods and Services 214,324.0 35.0
Internal VAT 120,605.6 19.7
External VAT 93,718.4 15.3
Taxes on Specific Goods and Services 114,491.4 18.7
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions 40,168.9 6.6
Green Taxes 7834.5 0.1
Other Taxes 1.6 0.0
Total Tax Revenue 611,746.8 100.0
Source: Ministry of the Dominican Republic
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The PIT (Table 2) presents a progressive and graduated scale, in which individuals with
annual income below 416,220 DOP3 are exempted. Income up to 624,329 DOP is taxed by
a marginal tax rate of 15.0%, followed by a marginal 20.0% rate for up to 867,123 DOP
annual income, and a marginal 25% rate for all income above this threshold. Individuals are
taxed separately from businesses. The latter are taxed by the BIT, which is set at a flat rate of
27.0%. The tax system guarantees certain exemptions and discounts to certain sectors that
fall under the Government’s development plan (such as tourism, export-processing zones
and firms located in border provinces, among many others) at both the individual and, more
predominantly, the business income level4. However, it does not consider any significant tax
benefits dependent on family structure or specific demographic characteristics5.
Table 2: Personal Income Tax Brackets
Annual Income Brackets Tax Rate
Up to 416,220 DOP Exempt
From 416,221 DOP up to
624,329 DOP 15.0% on income over 416,221 DOP
From 624,330 DOP up to
867,123 DOP
31,216 DOP and 20.0% on income over
624,330 DOP
Over 867,124 DOP 79,776 DOP and 25.0% on income over867,124 DOP
Source: Department of Internal Revenue of the Dominican Republic
The main VAT rate on goods and services is 18.0%, while there is also a limited set
of goods that are taxed at a reduced rate of 16.0%. In addition, a large list of goods and
services are exempt from the payment of VAT. Goods and services on this list are those
considered of primary need (e.g. live cattle, meat, fish, dairy, house utilities, health services,
funeral services, etc). It must be noted that the withholding agents for the VAT are the units
of production from which the final products are bought. Tax law allows taxpayers to deduct
from their gross tax the amounts of VAT paid to local and external suppliers. Lastly, excise
taxes on specific goods and services amount to 18.7% of total tax revenue. These consist of
differentiated tax rates and specific excise-duties for mineral oil, alcohol products, tobacco,
3Equivalent to just over 7,200 US dollars in 2020.
4The Ministry of Finance of the Dominican Republic estimates that tax expenditure from PIT and BIT are
0.78% of GDP (Ministry of Finance of the Dominican Republic, 2019)
5There are indeed social program in place that benefit the poorest households. However, participating in
these programs depend on the initial poverty status and not on income level nor its evolution. These programs
lack an exit strategy.
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telecommunication services, insurance services and electronic transfers.
As in many other developing countries, tax evasion is prevalent in the Dominican tax
system. In 2018, the Department of Internal Revenue (DGII in Spanish) estimated that
income tax evasion is higher than 60% while VAT evasion is close to 43% (Acosta, 2018).
Income tax avoidance is facilitated by the presence of high informality levels in the labor
market6. In 2020, 58.9% of workers 15 years or older were participating in the informal
sector.
4 Personal Income Tax Reform
4.1 Discrete Choice Model
4.1.1 Specification
In this section, I derive the labor supply model based on discrete choices for single individuals.
In this model, individuals derive utility from household income y and leisure time L, which
is denoted as L = T − h where T is total time available and h is hours of work. The
associated utility function that individuals seek to maximize is:
U = U(y, h;X) (4.1)
where X are demographic characteristics. Utilizing the notation in Labeaga et al. (2005),
the associated constraint is given by:
y = wh+ µ− T (h,w, µ,X) (4.2)
where T (h,w, µ,X) represents tax payment net of benefits that tends to depend on hours,
wages, non-labor income and demographic characteristics, and µ is non-labor income.
Therefore, the economic agent’s problem is:
Maxh U(y, h,X) s.t. y = µ+ wh− T (µ,w, h,X) (4.3)
(Keane and Moffitt, 1998), Blundell et al. (2000) and Labeaga et al. (2005) estimate
the parameters of this function following the flexible quadratic utility function. Single
individuals tend to decide the amount of hours they allocate to work independently, while
6The informality status of the employment is measured by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic as
the ENCFT administrators. The entity’s definition of informality considers legal status of the production unit,
access to social security, existence of written or oral contract, existence of other in-work benefits, domestic
workers retirement or health insurance plans status and household workers payment status.
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couples allocate their working hours simultaneously. Therefore, the utility function specified
in (4.4) contemplates singles exclusively. It is worth noting that the literature on discrete
choice labor supply models tends to include both singles and couples specifications, which
are estimated separately7.
U(y, h,X) = αyyy
2 + αhhh
2 + αyhyh+ βy(X)y + βh(X)h (4.4)
4.1.2 Data and estimation
In order to estimate the parameters in (4.4), it is necessary to establish the discrete choices
available to each individual in the finite set h ∈ {h1, h2, ...hK} that fulfills the observability
rule8. For each of the alternative number of hours in the choice set h, an associated
counterfactual net labor income level is assigned. In my estimation, I depart from the
literature by distinguishing between informal and formal hours of work and adding these
distinct employment type as different choices. Therefore, the new finite set becomes
h ∈ {h1f , h2f , ...hKf |h1in, h2in, ...hKin}, where f denotes formal employment and in denotes
informal employment. This distinction is important because counterfactual net labor income
levels depend of the tax structure, as show in (4.2), which in turn depend on the agent’s
employment type. Only in formal employment the individual is required to pay personal
income tax9, therefore, net income, y, associated with the finite choice set is:






7The specification commonly employed for couples is the following:






αyhfyhf + αhmhfhmhf + βyy + βhmhm + βhfhf
where hi andXi, i = m, f are hours and demographic characteristics of the member i in the couple, commonly,
male and female members of the couple.
8The observability rule is given by:
h = h1 if h ≤ hB1
= h2 if hB1 ≤ hB2
...
= hK−1 if hBK−1 < h ≤ hBK−1
= hK if h > hBK−1
9Although more prevalent in formal employment, both formal and informal labor can come with non-wage
benefits. These sources of labor income are not accounted for in my estimation.
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Likewise, leisure, l, for each alternative within the choice set is defined as 168, which is
the number of hours available to any individual each week, minus the number of work hours:
l ∈ {168− h1f , 168− wh2f , ...whKf |168− wh1in, 168− wh2in, ...168− whKin}
Stochastic terms that are assumed to be generated by extreme value distributions are
added in order to estimate the model. Therefore, I seek to estimate a multinomial logit
model10, which is the the discrete choice model that results from the assumption of an
extreme value distribution.
The choice probability for agent i under these assumptions is derived by:
Pr[hi = h
j, X] = Pr[U*ij > U*ik ∀k 6= j, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., K] (4.5)
Pr[hi = h
j, X] =
exp[U*(yij , T − hj;X]∑K
k=1 exp[U*(yik , T − hk;Z)]
(4.6)
where U* = U(.) + εhi.
With the independent errors hypothesis, the likelihood function to be estimated by








To apply this empirical strategy, I exploit the National Continuous Survey of Labor
Force (ENCFT in Spanish) of 2019. This survey is carried out by the Central Bank of the
Dominican Republic. This is a quarterly survey launched in 2016 designed to substitute the
National Labor Force Survey (ECFT, in Spanish), which had been conducted since 1991,
as the leading employment survey in the country. It contains living conditions and family
composition data of households, and employment, education and earnings data of a working
age member of the households. In order to obtain stable estimates, the ENCFT is conducted
through an overlapping panel of households with 80% of households being mutual in two
consecutive quarters, and 20% being mutual in the same quarter of two consecutive years.
This means that the observational units (households) are not constant throughout quarters.
From this survey, I gather monthly income, demographic and labor supply information
for single individuals. I further limit the sample to exclude self-employed and unemployed
10Specifically, I estimate a conditional logit model since only alternative-specific independent variables are
included, as opposed to individual-specific variables (McFadden, 1977).
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individuals, as well as students and those younger than 15 and older than 6511. The remaining
sub-sample consists of 18,852 single men and women. In order to select the intervals of
hours choices to be included in the finite set h, in Figure 1 I show histograms of weekly
working hours for singles in the formal and informal labor markets and in non-participation
status. I use the total number of hours across the first and second occupation, if any, per
individual.
Figure 1: Weekly hours of work of formal (left) and informal (right) single workers
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
When compared to developed countries, the labor force in the Dominican Republic
consists of fewer part-time workers. Regardless of formality status, most workers are
concentrated in the full-time interval and exhibit a large proportion of higher than 40 hours
work weeks. Informal workers show a slightly higher proclivity to work part-time12. Figure
2 shows the weekly working hours distributions for the whole sub-sample, including non-
participants, who amount to 50.9% for the sub-sample. I take into account the actual working
hours in the sub-sample to establish the following discrete set hf ∈ {15, 40, 50, 60} of formal
working hours and hin ∈ {15, 40, 50, 60} of informal working hours and h0 = 0 for non-
participation. Both hf and hin correspond to the intervals: < 5, 6−35, 36−45, 46−55, > 56.
Each individual’s choice set is comprised by the union of the hf , hin and h0 sets, resulting
in 9 different alternatives.
11In 2019, 72.5% of people over 65 were not working. Future estimation efforts can include a higher age
cutoff.
12The current sub-sample excludes self-employed individuals. Since most individuals that are self-employed
belong to the informal sector, by excluding them, the sub-sample goes from a majority of informal workers
(55%) to a minority (27%). Appendix A shows the weekly working hours histogram that includes all informal
workers.
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Figure 2: Weekly hours of work of single workers
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
As mentioned previously, in order to estimate the discrete choice model, counterfactual
labor income levels at alternative working hour points are required. To obtain these figures,
I start by computing the weekly gross hourly wage of the observed choice by dividing
weekly gross labor income by the observed weekly working hours. I then compute the
counterfactual gross labor income by multiplying the gross hourly wage by the number of
alternative working hours. Net labor income is calculated by applying the personal income
tax laws to the gross labor income. This last step provides the fundamental difference
between formal and informal hour choices. Net labor income for the informal hours is equal
to gross labor income while net labor income for the formal sector is equal to gross labor
income minus the mandatory social security contribution of 6.91% of labor income and the
personal income tax burden, if the individual’s gross labor income surpasses the official
exemption benchmark. In my sub-sample, the average gross weekly wages in the formal
sector is 4,179.4 DOP, compared to 2,118.5 DOP in the informal sector. After applying the
corresponding personal income tax burden in addition to the social security contribution,
the formal sector average weekly net wage amounts to 3,849.2 DOP.
For the purpose of assigning alternative labor income levels to individuals with non-
participation status, and therefore with unknown potential wages, I estimate a classical
Heckman selection model to correct for sample selection (Heckman, 1979) and input the
predicted wages to non-participants labor income’s counterfactual. The estimation output of
this model is shown in Appendix B.
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Lastly, I obtain estimates of the parameters of the utility function for (4.4) by optimizing
(4.7). As the demographic variables in vector X , I include the number of children, age
and secondary education of the individual. In Table 3 I report the results. All independent
variables are significant. However, the sign of the marginal utilities are unusual when
compared to those in the related literature. Whereas in most applications to Europe the
resulting marginal utility of income increases at a decreasing rate and is almost always
positive, my estimates do not identify concavity. This results in that the sign of the estimated
coefficients produce higher utility levels when leisure hours increase without being offset by
utility losses from net wage reductions, given the negative sign in netwage and netwage2. As
a consequence, predicted values are predominantly incorrect as they favor non-participation
in over 90% of individuals. One potential reason is that the current specification lacks
regressors that represent advantages to the formal sector. However, this is not sufficient to
explain the findings, because of the prevalence of non-participation instead of informality13.
These results point to the fact that the specification commonly employed in the discrete
choice labor supply literature, which is heavily European, might not be appropriate for a
developing country in which individuals’ labor supply choices are not based on leisure
preferences but rather imposed based on market structure and deficiencies. Factors beyond
leisure and net income seem to influence labor supply choices and are not accounted for in
European specifications.
The step following the estimation of the coefficients is the microsimulation stage in
which predicted choices are reevaluated for a set of new tax policy measures that would
affect net labor income for formal workers. This would alter all individual’s labor income
counterfactual, who would therefore adjust their working hours choices to a certain extent.
However, since I do not obtain reliable coefficients for the reasons set out in the previous
paragraph, this step is omitted.
4.2 Calibration
4.2.1 Specification
I employ the calibration methodology developed by Spadaro (2005). The author proposes a
microsimulation model that incorporates behavioral responses to changes in the tax-benefit
system through household productivity. This model integrates gross labor income, non-labor
income, tax-benefit laws as they apply to households and a set of arbitrary elasticities, along
13I estimate two additional models. In the first one, I exclude non-participation from the choice set. In the
second model, I include a proxy of fixed costs of working as an independent variable, as in Van Soest (1995).
In both estimations, the individual’s predictions predominantly favor the choices with the least amount of
working hours, demonstrating that the deficient identification persists.
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Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Netwage is net wage; Leisure is defined as the hours available to any given individual in a
week (24 ∗ 7 = 168) minus the number of weekly work hours; Children is the number of
children in the household; Age is age of the individual; SecEduc is secondary education.13
with the productivity variable w that comes from the proposed theoretical model of effort
supply. This model establishes the household maximization problem as:
Maxc,e U(c, e,N) s.t c = we+m− T (N,we,+m) (4.8)
where c is consumption with price fixed at one, e is supply of effort with price w which
is the remuneration of abilities (ROA), m is non-labor income and N is the size of the
household. I(·) represents the tax benefit system in place. Assuming the usual properties of
the utility function are satisfied, this function can be inverted, allowing for the value of w to
be recovered from observed gross income, corresponding taxes and benefits and disposable
income. By replacing the budget constraint in the maximization problem in (4.8) with a
non-linear budget constraint, the inversion of the optimal problem can be implemented
Spadaro (2005, p. 605). This linearization is performed by changing the constraint to:
c = mv + we(1− tmarg) (4.9)
wheremv denotes the virtual non-labor income and tmarg is the effective marginal tax
rate.14




where φ is a constant, α is the elasticity of e with respect to ROA, β is the elasticity of e
with respect to non-labor income, and wv is the virtual ROA15. The indirect utility function
associated with (4.11) is:
















Given that in the Dominican case there are no transfers that depend on income level and
only the marginal tax rate affects tmarg, there is no concern about the the effective marginal
14Virtual income is defined as the non-labor income that the individual would get if her earnings were zero
and she could stay on the virtual linearized budget Piketty and Saez (2012, p. 16).
15wv = w(1− tmarg)
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tax rate being 1 and rendering w incalculable.
4.2.2 Microsimulation results
In this section, I show the impact of an increase in the marginal tax rate of 5 percentage
points in each personal income tax bracket, including the exempted bracket in the baseline,
that is, the marginal tax rates go from 0, 15%, 20% and 25% to 5%, 20%, 25% and 30%. I
present a low-reaction scenario followed by a medium-reaction scenario.
I exploit the 2019 ENCFT data for a total of 11,140 households. I follow Spadaro
(2005) assignment of elasticities, which are α = 0.1 and α = 0.3 for the low-elasticity and
medium-elasticity scenario, respectively, and β = −0.2 and β = −0.4 for each respective
scenario. Concurrently, φ is assigned values of 2.7 and 2.5, respectively16. These elasticities,
except for φ were selected by the author as to follow the microeconometric literature on labor
supply mainly for European countries, which undoubtedly is of dubious validity for other
countries. As seen in section 4.1, it is not surprising that frameworks that hold for certain
developed countries might not be the most appropriate for different contexts. However, in
order to establish an upper bound of behavioral responses for the Dominican case, I continue
with the calibrated approach.
Since the Dominican personal income tax system is designed at the individual level
and does not incorporate deductions based on family composition or expenditure types, I
perform the analysis at the individual level and then aggregate it to the household level
for income distribution effects. I start by assigning the correspondent marginal tax rate
to each individual in the baseline scenario according to the personal income tax brackets
associated with their income level, as well as their social security contribution. As in section
4.1, informality is taken into account and informal individuals are not assigned neither tax
burdens nor social contribution allocations.
I obtain the productivity distribution of the sample given by (4.12). In Figure 4, I show
the productivity distribution in the low-elasticities and the medium-elasticities scenarios. It
is clear to see that higher elasticities conduct to a slightly more equal distribution of ROA at
its initial levels.
Behavioral simulation results after the personal income reform is implemented are
reported in Table 4 for adult equivalent17, where I show the average percentage change
16Spadaro (2005) calibrates φ as to normalize to 1 the effort supply of a single employee who works
full-time and earns the minimum wage by using an algorithm of utility maximization. I omit this step and
proceed with using the author’s calibrated values. In order to ensure that the results are not too dependent on
this strong assumption, in Appendix C I perform a robustness check that bootstraps 60 values of phi from 0.1
to 6.
17(Adult equivalent = square root of household size)
15
Figure 3: Distribution of ROA rate for low (left) and medium (right) elasticities
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
in gross income, disposable income and net taxes for the low-elasticities scenario. As a
result of the reform, gross income does not change significantly. The poorest gross income
quintile only registers an increase of 0.1% of this figure, while the fifth quintile’s increases
by 0.3%. The change in disposable income is also higher in absolute value for the fifth
quintile (-3.0%) than for the poorest quintile (-0.1%). The reason disposable income is
not affected proportionally for all quintiles when the reform adds 5 percentage points to all
working individuals’ tax burdens is because of informality in the labor market, which allows
just over half of the individuals, specially those in the poorest quintiles, to avoid paying taxes.
The scenario with medium-elasticities presented in Table 5 shows a similar trend. However,
decreases in disposable income are diminished by virtue of the slightly higher gross income
responses in this scenario, but this increase in gross income is not enough to offset the tax
increase. Appendix D shows that in a scenario with no informality, that is, when all workers
are subject to personal income tax and social security contributions, the average change in
disposable income is closer to the 5 percentage point increments in the personal income tax
rates reform, as expected. Again, when agents respond more actively to the new tax rates, as
in the scenario with higher elasticities, the decline in disposable income is mitigated.
One obvious conclusion that arises from this analysis is that the effect of a tax reform
that seeks to eliminate the exempted personal income tax bracket that currently covers most
16
individuals18 is mitigated by the existence of informality.
Table 4: Redistribution performance of tax reform: low-elasticities scenario. Expressed in
values per adult equivalent (adult equivalent = square root of household size)
Quintile Avg. Change inGross Income




1 0.0005 −0.005 -
2 0.002 −0.018 -
3 0.002 −0.022 0.002
4 0.003 −0.024 0.027
5 0.003 −0.030 0.118
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
Table 5: Redistribution performance of tax reform: medium-elasticities scenario. Expressed
in values per adult equivalent (adult equivalent = square root of household size)
Quintile Avg. Change inGross Income




1 0.001 −0.004 -
2 0.005 −0.016 -
3 0.006 −0.018 0.002
4 0.007 −0.020 0.027
5 0.008 −0.025 0.122
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
Following Spadaro (2005), I pay attention to the concerns of the statistical representa-
tivity of the ENCFT sub-sample and perform a bootstrapping analysis by replicating my
computations for 1000 alternative subsamples generated randomly with replacement from
the original distribution. In Table 6 and Table 7, I report the results. These show that the
recovered standard errors for the change in disposable income aggregated by adult equivalent
are very small, and that the upper and lower band of the 95% confidence intervals is very
similar to the average changes in the original sub-sample.
Lastly, Table 8 shows inequality indices on per adult equivalent disposable income in
different scenarios: baseline, post-reform with low elasticities and post-reform with medium
18In the pre-reform scenario, only 91% of wage-earners in the sample earn enough to pay personal income
tax.
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Table 6: Bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals for simulations results: low-
elasticities scenario
Quintiles Avg. Change in Dis-posable Income Std. Error 95% Lower 95% Upper
1 −0.004 0.00001 −0.004 −0.004
2 −0.017 0.00001 −0.018 −0.017
3 −0.022 0.00001 −0.022 −0.022
4 −0.025 0.00001 −0.025 −0.025
5 −0.030 0.00001 −0.030 −0.030
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
Table 7: Bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals for simulations results: medium-
elasticities scenario
Quintiles Avg. Change in Dis-posable Income Std. Error 95% Lower 95% Upper
1 −0.004 0.00001 −0.004 −0.003
2 −0.015 0.00001 −0.015 −0.015
3 −0.019 0.00001 −0.019 −0.019
4 −0.021 0.00001 −0.021 −0.021
5 −0.026 0.00001 −0.026 −0.026
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
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elasticities. Clearly, when the tax reform is implemented the Gini index points to more
inequality in the economy, which is slightly worsened if the scenario that is taken into
account is that of medium elasticities. Two values of α (a parameter of inequality aversion)
are evaluated for the Atkinson index19. When there is a high aversion to inequality (α = 0.1,
both elasticities scenarios perform equally poorly in regards to post-reform equality. When
there is low aversion to inequality (α = 0.99, the scenario that entails the least erosion of
equality is the one with low elasticities.
Table 8: Inequality index for different scenarios calculated on per adult equivalent disposable
income
Scenario Gini Atkinson (a = 0.01) Atkinson (a = 0.99)
Baseline 0.536 0.005 0.467
Low Elasticities 0.551 0.006 0.476
Medium Elasticities 0.552 0.006 0.481
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
5 Value-Added Tax Reform
5.1 Specification
In this section, the AIDS model is derived. The starting point of the AIDS is individuals’
expenditure function which in turn is used to derive flexible share equations is:




where U is the utility level and pi is the price of good i, and
lnα(p) = α0 +
∑
i







γ∗ij ln pi ln pj (5.2)
where α, β and γ are parameters. Form to be linearly homogeneous in p, the following








γij = 0 ∀j (5.3)
19This index measures the proportion of income that could be sacrificed without social welfare loss if income
were to be equally distributed.
19
The uncompensated demand functions can be derived from (5.1) by applying Shephard’s
Lemma and replacing the unobservable utility index by the indirect utility function related
tom, as done by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p. 313) and following a cross-sectional



















and P is is a translog
price index given by:
lnP = α0 +
∑
i







γij ln pi ln pj (5.5)
For simplicity, expenditure equations can be expressed as budget shares:
si(p,m) = αi +
∑
j
γij ln pj + βi ln(m/P ) (5.6)
where si = xipi/m . Given the restrictions in (5.3), expenditure shares are guaranteed to
sum up to one.
5.2 Data and estimation
The econometric estimation of the uncompensated demand equations in (5.6) requires
replacing the observed budget shares wi with the unobservable budget shares si with added
disturbance terms ui:
wi = αi +
∑
j




While (5.3) guarantees that the observed budget shares equals one and that the disturbance
terms ui sum up to zero, it follows that the covariance matrix is singular Blanciforti and
Green (1983, p. 512). This requires one equation to be dropped from the estimation
and to be therefore calculated as a residual in the adding-up restriction. Lastly, Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980) suggest to approximate the translog price P with the Stone index,
lnP S =
∑















To estimate this model, data on household expenditures and associated prices are required.
The household-level monthly expenditures were gathered from the Household Income and
Expenditure and National Survey from 2018 (ENGIH, in Spanish) for 8,892 households.
This survey is carried out by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic with the purpose
of gathering statistical information throughout the territory on the distribution of spending
by Dominican families as well as the amount and sources of income of the population. It
is conducted at the household level and it contains living condition measures along with
information on monthly expenditures and labor and non-labor income sources. Expenditure
data is registered at the item level and for most products the information on the place of
purchase is also registered. This latter piece of information allows identifying which items
were purchased in store-types that are more likely to be informal, which, following Bachas
et al. (2020), is an approximation of informal purchase of goods and services20.
The consumption data obtained from this survey were aggregated in 12 consumption
categories: (1) non-alcoholic food and beverages, (2) alcohol and tobacco products, (3)
clothing, (4) housing and utilities, (5) furnishings, (6) health, (7) transportation, (8)
communication, (9) entertainment, (10) education, (11) restaurants and hotels, and (12)
diverse goods and services.
Baseline price indices at the category level are obtained from the average national
Consumption Price Index (CPI) provided by the Central Bank21.
The uncompensated demand elasticities obtained from estimating the parameters in
(5.8) are shown in Table 9. As expected, most own-price elasticities are negative. The
only exception is the Clothing category. The occurrence of unusual elasticities is similar to
that documented by Oliva (2008) and Figueroa and Peña (2017), who find its roots in the
cross-sectional nature of the available expenditure data, which is unable to take into account
a time component in order to estimate parameters that more closely represent the behavior
of a set of households. Another check on the elasticities obtained from the AIDS model is
to evaluate income elasticities. The positive sign of the income elasticities in Appendix F
indicate, as expected, that all consumption groups comprise normal goods, which means
that their consumption increases as income rises.
20See Appendix E
21Other research papers utilize more ideal price indices, such as expenditures divided by quantities when













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Once the elastiticities are obtained22, I performmicrosimulations through the introduction
of price changes through increases in consumption tax rates, which result in new budget
shares. Additionally, in order to assess the pass-through of an increase in the consumption
tax rate to prices, I make further assumptions about the informal economy.
In order to both obtain ex-post prices, that is, prices after the indirect tax reform takes
place, and tax burden distribution among households, I assign tax rates corresponding to the
official VAT rates in the tax law to each consumption item within each of the 12 consumption
categories, differentiating between products and services taxed at the 18%, 16% and those
exempted. By multiplying the household expenditure on each item by its corresponding
tax rate, I obtain a preliminary tax burden measure for each item for each household. This
preliminary measure is adjusted to account for informality in the economy, that is, tax
evasion by means of non-abiding vendors. For this, I follow Bachas et al. (2020), who
use the type of store in which purchases are realized as a proxy for informal, and therefore
untaxed, consumption. Appendix E provides further details.
Ex-post prices are obtained by adjusting baseline price indices with the new tax rates
while also accounting for informality in the economy as follows:




1 + V ATratePosth,j









wPreh,i ∗ (1− Informalh,j) ∗ V ATratePosti
(5.9)
where Pj represents the price index of the group of goods j, Informalhj is the fraction
of goods of group j that household h buys from non-abiding vendors, V ATratehj represents
the weighted average VAT rate for household h and group j, and whi is the budget share for
household h for good i.
An important assumption that has remained implicit so far is that of a complete pass-
through of increased tax rates from the producers to the consumers. This approach is
common in the literature.




In this section, I first contemplate the redistributive implications of a tax reform that consists
on the elimination of current VAT exemptions and reduced rates in the Dominican Republic.
This implies that goods and services exempted from VAT and those taxed at 16% will now
be set at the standard 18%, except for the consumption groups of Health and Education.
Second, I analyze the role of informal markets in reducing the regressivity of a reform of
this type.
As a result of the tax reform, the effective weighted average VAT rates by consumption
group are evidently altered, as seen in Table 10. To better illustrate the concept of an effective
weighted VAT rate in the presence of informality, it is worth indicating that if all markets
were formal, column 3 in this table would equal 0.18 for all consumption categories, except
for the Health and Education groups. This table shows that the reform affects the rates
substantially primarily for the Transportation, Diverse Goods and Services and Housing and
Utilities groups. This is a result of a combination of low pre-reform rates, in the case of
Transportation and Diverse Goods and Services, and lower than average informality within
these groups23.
Table 10: Effective Weighted VAT Rates Before and After Reform
Consumption Group Pre-reform Post-reform Variation
Food and Beverages 0.892 2.390 1.497
Alcohol and Tobacco 0.514 1.217 0.703
Clothing 12.100 12.100 0.000
Housing and Utilities 6.256 12.069 5.183
Furnishings 7.646 7.668 0.022
Health 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transportation 1.099 17.273 16.173
Communication 14.493 14.493 0.000
Entertainment 11.373 15.294 3.922
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Restaurants and Hotels 1.812 1.812 1.812
Diverse Goods and Services 3.638 10.550 6.911
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
Table 11 shows that after the reform is implemented, the categories that gain participation
are those that represent necessities, such as Health, Food and Beverages, and Transportation.
23See Table 22 in Appendix E.
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In contrast, a decline in relative consumption is displayed by Education, Diverse Goods and
Alcohol and Tobacco. Evidently, one would expect households to shift some proportion of
their consumption to the informal market once they perceive an increase in prices through
the VAT. However, in my microsimulation exercise, I assume informality remains unaltered
in the post-reform world.
Table 11: Budget Shares Before and After Reforms
Consumption Group Pre-reform Post-reform Variation
Food and Beverages 0.251 0.264 0.013
Alcohol and Tobacco 0.022 0.017 −0.005
Clothing 0.043 0.041 −0.002
Housing and Utilities 0.104 0.107 0.003
Furnishings 0.039 0.044 −0.004
Health 0.063 0.069 0.066
Transportation 0.111 0.116 0.005
Communication 0.035 0.034 −0.001
Entertainment 0.025 0.025 0.000
Education 0.032 0.022 −0.010
Restaurants and Hotels 0.136 0.133 −0.003
Diverse Goods and Services 0.140 0.128 −0.012
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
The resulting tax burden following the reform is presented in Table 12, which distinguishes
between expenditure quintiles. In particular, the VAT tax burden as a proportion of total
expenditures is 2.2% for the poorest quintile and 4.8% for the richest quintile. Once the
reform is implemented these figures become 6.0% and 10.8%, respectively. Except for the
fourth quintile, which shows a smaller tax burden in terms of total expenditure than the
third quintile, it is clear to see that tax burden before and after the reform shows a similar
progressive trend. The same is true for the VAT burden as a share of household income.
The fact that both pre-reform and post-reform scenarios follow this trend indicates that
informality is the main driver of progressivity in the Dominican indirect tax system 24, since
relative tax burdens between quintiles are nearly unaffected when low-rates and exemptions
are absent and informality is taken into account.
To better assess this tendency, I perform another microsimulation exercise without
accounting for informal markets by departing from the methodology from Bachas et al.
24I am only taking the VAT into account. Different conclusions would stem from an analysis that includes
the excise taxes.
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Table 12: VAT Burden by Expenditure Quintiles
Quintiles As a share of Expenditure As a share of Income
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
1 0.022 0.069 0.019 0.057
2 0.027 0.076 0.025 0.069
3 0.033 0.082 0.029 0.074
4 0.037 0.090 0.034 0.081
5 0.048 0.108 0.042 0.095
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
(2020). In Table 13, I present the results. As hypothesized, the VAT burden in the pre-reform
scenario becomes completely regressive across expenditure quintiles by going from 8.7%
of the expenditures of the poorest quintile to 7.7% of those of the richest quintile. This is
explained by the fact that, contrary to policy intention, the richest households benefit the most
from existing exemptions when there is no informality25. Once the reform is implemented,
this tendency persists, as seen in column 3 of Table 13. The VAT tax burden starts at 16.7%
for the poorest quintile and decreases progressively until reaching 15.7% of the expenditures
of the households in the richest quintile. The reason for this is that when reduced rates are
no longer in place and only exemptions in the Health and Education groups remain, the
richest households benefit the most because they devote a higher proportion of their budget
to these consumption groups than their poorer counterparts.
Table 13: VAT Burden by Expenditure Quintiles Without Informality
Quintiles As a share of Expenditure As a share of Income
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
1 0.088 0.167 0.073 0.138
2 0.081 0.163 0.073 0.148
3 0.079 0.163 0.070 0.145
4 0.077 0.161 0.069 0.146
5 0.077 0.157 0.067 0.138
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
2563.5% of expenditures by the richest expenditure quintile is exempted, whereas 53.6% of expenditures by
the poorest quintile is exempted.
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In Table 14 I present the average VAT burden for all households before and after the
reform along with the Gini index and the Reynolds-Smolensky index26. The Gini index
remains practically unchanged after the reform takes place in both informality scenarios,
which indicates that inequality is not worsened by the change in VAT rates. The more
negative Reynolds-Smolensky indices resulting from the reform , on the other hand, indicate
that the indirect tax system becomes more regressive. This negative index is a common
occurrence for Central American countries (Cubero and Hollar, 2010).
Table 14: Redistributive Measures Before and After VAT Reform
Informality Scenario VAT burden Gini Index Reynolds-Smolensky Index
With Pre-reform 0.033 0.352 −0.0000002288Post-reform 0.079 0.357 −0.0000006182
Without Pre-reform 0.081 0.363 −0.0000009815Post-reform 0.163 0.362 −0.000001862
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
6 Conclusion
This paper applied three different behavioral microsimulation methods commonly used in
the tax reform literature to the Dominican case. The main insight resulting from the personal
income tax simulations is that theoretical models designed in the context of European
generous tax-benefit systems might not apply in the context of market deficiencies that
characterize developing countries and that distort the role of leisure in the specified utility
function. Future efforts can be directed to developing specifications that would hold in
contexts less ideal than those of developed countries.
The second insight emanating from the personal income tax reform simulation through
calibration is that the predominance of informal employment in the poorest quintiles mitigates
the impact of a personal income tax reform. I also find that when elasticities of hours
with respect to remuneration and with respect to non-labor income are high, inequality is
worsened.
26The Gini index measures the extent to which distribution of (in this case) consumption departs from a
perfectly equal distribution. The Reynolds-Smolensky index measures how income inequality changes in terms
of Gini points when a tax is introduced (Cubero and Hollar, 2010).
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These results hold after robustness checks through sample bootstrapping are implemented.
As much as the results from the discrete choice model are dubious because of a possible
unsuitable specification, the elasticities that were employed that also come from European
literature might not be the most appropriate. For that reason, it is imperative to stress that
the results only constitute an upper bound of possible behavioral responses. An obvious
future step for the calibration approach would be to incorporate elasticities from the Latin
American literature.
On the other hand, the main insight from the VAT reform simulation is that informality,
and not existing exemptions, in the markets of goods and services is the main driver of
progressivity in the Dominican VAT system. That means that a reform that increases VAT
rates, making all households worse-off, will only significantly worsen inequality if informal
market purchases are reduced for everyone or are reduced disproportionally for poorer
quintiles. This suggests that if the Government combines VAT rate increases with an effort
to reduce informality in the markets of goods and services, poor households would be more
negatively affected by the reform.
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A Histogram of Working Hours of Singles with Full Infor-
mality
Figure 4: Weekly hours of work of single informal workers, including self-employed
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
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B Heckman Selection Model
Table 15: Estimation results of wage regressions for singles: log of hourly wage as the
dependent variable.
Regressors Single males Single females
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Probit selection equation
Intercept −6.1299∗∗∗ 0.1200 −6.6627∗∗∗ 0.1487
Age 0.2911∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.2996∗∗∗ 0.0067
Age2 −0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0001
Urban −0.1182∗∗ 0.0364 0.0783∗ 0.0365
NL_Income −0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0000
East 0.4639∗∗∗ 0.0.0421 0.1975∗∗∗ 0.0399
Cibao 0.3627∗∗∗ 0.0526 0.1480∗∗ 0.0486
Prim Educ 0.7020∗∗∗ 0.0769 0.7023∗∗∗ 0.0844
Sec Educ 1.0155∗∗∗ 0.0776 0.9873∗∗∗ 0.0847
Univ Educ 0.8297∗∗∗ 0.0872 1.2438∗∗∗ 0.0866
Children 0.6892∗ 0.3085 0.1323∗∗∗ 0.0321
Child_O6 −0.1067 0.3763 0.1415∗ 0.0655
Outcome equation
Intercept 5.0318∗∗∗ 1.5035 4.0268∗∗∗ 0.7443
Age −0.0705 0.0584 −0.0156 0.0285
Age2 0.0010 0.0007 0.0003 0.0003
Prim Educ −0.7711∗ 0.3238 −1590 0.2082
Sec Educ −0.7240∗ 0.35338 −0.0097 0.2143
Univ Educ 0.0443 0.3592 0.7910∗∗∗ 0.2218
Urban 0.3911∗∗ 0.1326 −0.1185 0.0689
East −0.0588 0.1827 0.498 0.0808
Cibao 0.2334 0.2088 0.0973 0.0943
Inv Mills Ratio −0.8258∗ 0.3429 −0.3520∗∗ 0.1320
Sigma 3.5583 . 1.7343 .
Rho −0.2321 . −0.2030 .
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C Robustness check: φ
Table 16: Robustness check for φ: low-elasticities scenario
Quintiles Avg. Change in Dis-posable Income Std. Error 95% Lower 95% Upper
1 −0.004 0.00003 −0.004 −0.004
2 −0.017 0.0001 −0.017 −0.017
3 −0.020 0.0001 −0.020 −0.020
4 −0.023 0.0001 −0.023 −0.023
5 −0.028 0.00004 −0.028 −0.028
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
Table 17: Robustness check for φ: medium-elasticities scenario
Quintiles Avg. Change in Dis-posable Income Std. Error 95% Lower 95% Upper
1 −0.003 0.00002 −0.003 −0.003
2 −0.015 0.0001 −0.015 −0.015
3 −0.017 0.00005 −0.017 −0.017
4 −0.019 0.00004 −0.019 −0.019
5 −0.024 0.00003 −0.024 −0.024
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
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D Redistribution Performance without Informality
Table 18: Redistribution performance of tax reform without informality: low-elasticities
scenario. Expressed in values per adult equivalent (adult equivalent = square root of
household size)
Quintile Avg. Change inGross Income




1 0.0001 −0.014 -
2 0.004 −0.039 -
3 0.005 −0.044 0.004
4 0.005 −0.047 0.048
5 0.005 −0.051 0.223
Table 19: Redistribution performance of tax reform without informality: medium-elasticities
scenario. Expressed in values per adult equivalent (adult equivalent = square root of
household size)
Quintile Avg. Change inGross Income




1 0.004 −0.012 -
2 0.010 −0.033 -
3 0.012 −0.037 0.004
4 0.013 −0.039 0.049
5 0.014 −0.043 0.229
Source: ENCFT, own calculations
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
E Measurement of Informal Consumption
For 31 countries, Bachas et al. (2020) create a criteria for determining purchases realized in
the informal economy, as this information is not usually available in expenditure surveys. The
authors classify expenditures by place of purchase by assigning each to one of five categories
of goods: (1) non-market consumption (domestic production), (2) non-brick-and-mortar
stores (public markets, street stalls), (3) corner and convenience stores, (4) specialized stores
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Table 20: Informal Store Types Classifications
Bachas et al. (2020) Classification Informal Store Types
Non brick-and-mortar stores Parking
Non-market consumption Households
Non-market consumption Neighborhood councils
Non brick-and-mortar stores Flea markets
Non brick-and-mortar stores Street markets
Corner and convenience shops Tailors
Non brick-and-mortar stores Fried chicken vendors
Non brick-and-mortar stores Milk sellers
Non brick-and-mortar stores Chicken stalls
Non brick-and-mortar stores Empanadas stalls
Corner and convenience shops Tire shops
Corner and convenience shops Shoes repairs
Corner and convenience shops Beauty salons and barber shops
Corner and convenience shops Secondhand clothing markets
Non brick-and-mortar stores Street vendors
Non brick-and-mortar stores Coal sellers
Non brick-and-mortar stores Firewood sellers
Non brick-and-mortar stores Fruit stalls
Service provided by an individual Particular individuals
Source: Own classification
and (5) large stores (department stores, supermarkets). These categories are ranked in a
descending order by probability of informality. There are two additional categories for
services: (1) services provided by an institution and (2) services provided by an individual.
Their key assumption, which they test for, Cameroon, Mexico, Peru and Rwanda, is that the
smaller the retailer, the higher their probability of participating in the informal economy.
This is further supported by theoretical findings, such as Kleven et al. (2016) and Hsieh
and Olken (2014).
Following Bachas et al. (2020)methodology, the expenditures realized in the store types
in Table 20 are deemed untaxed in the empirical application to the Dominican case.
For the ENGIH 2018, after applying this methodology, I assume that 53.2% of total
expenditures are conducted in the informal market. The proportion of informal expenditures
is, as expected, higher in the poorests quintile of households. Whenmeasured both in quintiles
of expenditures, Table 21 shows that the first quintile realizes 66.1% of its expenditures in the
informal market and this proportion steadily declines and reaches 38.8% of the expenditures
of the fifth quintile. These figures remain practically unchanged when measured by quintiles
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of income and are consistent with Bachas et al. (2020) values for other countries. For
instance, the informal budget share falls from 90% for the poorest decile of households to
70% for the richest ones for Rwanda, while for Mexico, these figures go from 55% to 25%.
This indicates that the Dominican Republic also shows a downward-sloping informality
Engel curve, that is, the budget share for informal goods and services declines with household
income.







Source: ENGIH, own calculations
When considering informality by consumption group and quintiles of expenditure, as seen
in Table 22 it is evident that for most consumption groups, downward-sloping informality
Engel curves persist. Notable exceptions are Alcohol and Tobacco and Restaurants and
Hotels, among others.
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Table 22: Informal Budget Shares by Consumption Groups and Expenditure Quintiles
Groups Quintiles1 2 3 4 5
Food and Beverages 0.918 0.921 0.879 0.847 0.711
Alcohol and Tobacco 0.254 0.307 0.358 0.441 0.431
Clothing 0.309 0.302 0.271 0.248 0.207
Housing and Utilities 0.296 0.302 0.330 0.345 0.348
Furnishings 0.775 0.653 0.544 0.452 0.405
Health 0.057 0.051 0.052 0.055 0.042
Transportation 0.023 0.027 0.032 0.035 0.056
Communication 0.112 0.167 0.157 0.156 0.139
Entertainment 0.066 0.111 0.114 0.104 0.087
Education 0.174 0.310 0.349 0.342 0.277
Restaurants and Hotels 0.715 0.767 0.795 0.792 0.745
Diverse Goods and Services 0.508 0.443 0.403 0.377 0.335
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
F Income Elasticities in the AIDS Model
Table 23: Income Elasticities
Food and Beverages 0.769 Transportation 1.454
Alcohol and Tobacco 1.250 Communication 1.282
Clothing 1.086 Entertainment 1.401
Housing and Utilities 0.926 Education 1.349
Furnishings 1.232 Restaurants and Hotels 0.519
Health 1.217 Diverse Goods and Services 0.991
Source: ENGIH, own calculations
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